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COMMACK SELF-SERVICE KOSHER MEATS,
INC., V. RUBIN: ARE KOSHER FOOD
CONSUMERS NO LONGER ENTITLED TO





Over ninety years ago, the federal government began to
recognize the consumer's right and need to be protected from
widespread deception in the open market.1 This protection has
taken many forms, and has been extended by federal legislation
into various areas of the market. For example, such legislation
has had a distinctively strong influence on the food industry,2
particularly in the area of kosher food regulation. In fact,
regulation of the kosher food industry has sparked litigation in
both federal and state courts.3  Specifically, constitutional
t J.D. Candidate, June 2002, St. John's University School of Law, B.A., Boston
University.
1 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934). The
Supreme Court addressed a consumer's right to be protected from deceptive
practices stating, "[The public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the choice
may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance." Id.
2 See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1997)
(stating that the former Food and Drug Act of 1906 was originally enacted in order
to prevent the placement of misbranded and adulterated articles of medicine and
food).
3 See, e.g., Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 498 (1925)
(involving due process and equal protection challenges to New York State kosher
fraud laws); see also Barghout v. Mayor and City Council, 600 A.2d 841 (Md. 1992)
(questioning whether intent to defraud is required under Maryland kosher fraud
laws); Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992) (holding
New Jersey kosher fraud law is unconstitutional); Erlich v. Mun. Court of the
Beverly Hills Judicial Dist., 360 P.2d 334, 335 (Cal. 1961) (inquiring whether the
word kosher is too vague to justify criminal liability); People v. Atlas, 170 N.Y.S.
834, 835-36 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (arguing the meaning of "kosher" is too vague for
criminal prosecution), affid, 130 N.E. 921 (N.Y. 1921).
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challenges have been made to various state4 kosher fraud laws.5
Recently, in Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin,6
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York heard a challenge to New York State's kosher fraud laws.7
4 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-942 (West 1998); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-
57-401 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE § 383b (Deering 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53-317 (Michie 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-331 (1998); 410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. % 645/1 (West 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.850 (Michie 1998); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:608 (1998); MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW I 14-903 (2000); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 94, § 156 (Law. Co-op. 1998); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.297e (1998);
MINN. STAT. § 31.651 (West 1998); Mo. ANN. REV. STAT. § 196.165 (West 1997);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1329.29 (West 1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4107.1
(West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-16-1 (1998); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
17.822 (Vernon 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-236 (Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE §
69.90.020 (1998); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 97.56 (West 1998).
5 See Hygrade Provision Co., 266 U.S. at 501-02 (hearing a challenge to the
New York Kosher Fraud Statute using the word "kosher" and the phrase
"[O]rthodox Hebrew religious requirements," and finding that neither was
unconstitutionally vague); see also Gerald F. Masoudi, Note, Kosher Food
Regulation and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
667, 673-74 (1993) (noting that "[tihe Supreme Court has considered the
constitutionality of kosher food laws only under the Commerce Clause" and that
"[oinly one state court has overturned a kosher food law on a constitutional
challenge") (citing Hygrade Provision, 266 U.S. at 497). The Religion Clauses were
not applicable to the states until Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Two
courts have fully considered Establishment Clause challenges to kosher fraud laws.
For a further discussion of these courts' considerations, see Barghout v. Bureau of
Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1995) and Ran-Day's County
Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992).
6 106 F. Supp. 2d 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
7 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. §§ 201-a to -h (McKinney 2000). Section 201-a provides,
in pertinent part:
A person who, with intent to defraud, sells or exposes for sale any...
food.., and falsely represents the same to be kosher.., or as having been
prepared under... the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements ....
without displaying... the words 'we sell kosher meat and food only.., we
sell non-kosher meat and food only... [or] we sell both kosher and non-
kosher meat and food' as the case may be, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, except that a person who with intent to defraud sells ...
meat.., and falsely represents the same to be kosher.., provided said
meat... in violation has a retail value in excess of five thousand
dollars ... is guilty of a class E felony.
Id. Section 201-a notes further that "[plossession of non-kosher meat and food,
in any place of business advertising the sale of kosher meat and food only, is
presumptive evidence that the person in possession exposes the same for sale
with intent to defraud...." Id. Section 201-b provides for penalties if a person
"with intent to defraud, sells ... in any hotel, restaurant, or other place... food
or food products, and falsely represents the same to be kosher.., or as having
been prepared under.., the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements ... ." Id.
Section 201-c prohibits the fraudulent identification of food and food products
and provides in pertinent part: "No person shall:... [w]illfully mark, tag...
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The Court held New York State's kosher fraud laws8 on their
face violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment9
to the United States Constitution. 10
In Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., the plaintiffs,
proprietors of a butcher shop in Commack, Long Island, had
received citations from The New York State Department of
Agriculture and Markets (the "Department") alleging violations
of the state kosher laws." The most recent alleged violation
occurred in February 1993, when Department Inspector P.
Schnell cited plaintiffs for "attempting to sell as kosher poultry
label... or by any other means... represent... as kosher... food or food
products not kosher.. . ." Id. Section 201-d describes the penalties for violation
of the statutes. See id. Section 201-e sets forth regulations concerning labeling
and record keeping. See id. Section 201-e (2-a) provides that "[uin the event that
non-prepackaged fresh meat or poultry is sold and delivered off-premises as
Kosher... [it] ... shall have affixed to [it] a label or the printed words 'not
soaked and salted' or 'soaked and salted' as the case may be." Id. Section 201-e
(3-c) provides that:
Any person or firm owning or operating a slaughterhouse which produces
meat or poultry which is offered as kosher ... shall keep records...
subject to inspection by the department, regarding time, place, date,
person or organization supervising the slaughter of the animal and the
number of animals slaughtered in accordance with orthodox Hebrew
religious requirements.
Id. Section 201-f mandates certain tagging and preparation requirements for "all
meat or poultry which is sold ... and is represented as having been prepared in
accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious requirements...." Finally, section 201-
h provides for the unlavwiul labeling of "food or food products with the words parve
or pareve or in any way to indicate that the food... may be used or consumed
indiscriminately with meat, poultry or dairy products according to Orthodox
Hebrew requirements" where it would be impermissible to do so. Id. Additionally,
section 26-a(1), establishes a nine-member advisory board to "advise, counsel and
confer with the commissioner on matters of policy in connection with the
administration and enforcement of laws and rules relating to kosher meats, meat
preparations, and food products...." Id. § 26-a(1), (4).
8 Id. §§ 201-a to -h.
9 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10 See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 445.
Although plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality under both the United States
and New York State Constitutions, this Comment is limited to discussion of the
federal Constitution. The court in Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., relying
on Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), concluded that, "even taking Agostini
beyond its school aid context, the entanglements involved here between religion and
the State are not only excessive, in themselves, but they have the unconstitutional
effect of endorsing and advancing religion." See Commack Self-Service Kosher
Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
11 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. §§ 201-a to -h.
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that did not bear the proper labeling."1 2 Plaintiffs were cited for
similar violations in July 1986,13 January 1987,14 and April
1988.15 In response to the most recent alleged violation, on
January 16, 1996, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the
Department seeking a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the statutes. 16 Plaintiffs claimed New York
State's kosher fraud laws define "kosher" food as food that is
"prepared in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious
requirements" and in so doing, they violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment 7  of the United States
Constitution.' 8  Plaintiffs application for a preliminary
injunction was denied on June 18, 1998.19 The defendant and
intervenors later sought summary judgment dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint, arguing that enforcement of the kosher
fraud laws is necessary to protect consumers from fraud in this
specialized area of the food industry, and does not violate the
Establishment Clause.20
The significance of kosher food fraud depends on what
"kosher" means to consumers of kosher food. The word "kosher"
12 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 448. The
plaintiffs disputed the report, and claimed that the poultry had not been offered for
sale at the time of the inspection. Further, they argued that eighteen of the
nineteen boxes referred to in the inspector's report were originally delivered in
boxes with labels stating that the poultry "was kosher in accordance with the
supervisory standards of the Union of Orthodox Congregations." Id.
13 In July 1986, plaintiffs were cited for failing to "soak and salt" veal spare
ribs. Id. The notice plaintiffs received stated that the package of veal spare ribs had
not been "soaked and salted as mandated by Hebrew orthodox religious
requirements." Id.
14 In January 1987, plaintiffs were cited for being in possession of an unsalted
product, side steaks, because they had not been salted "as mandated by Hebrew
orthodox religious requirements." Id. Although the defendant did not dispute the
evidence put forth by plaintiffs, the defendant stated that the Department had no
records of the 1986 and 1987 citations. Id. at 449.
15 In April 1988, the Department quarantined lamb tongues claiming that the
tongues had not been properly soaked and salted. Id.
16 See id. at 450. An amended complaint was filed on April 15, 1996, and on
December 9, 1996. The intervenors' motion for permissive intervention was granted.
Id. See infra note 20 for a list of defendants who were permitted to join the action as
intervenors.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18 See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
19 See id. at 450.
20 Id. at 446. The intervenors who were permitted to join the action as
defendants are several Orthodox Jewish organizations, a rabbi, a competitor of
plaintiffs, and individual consumers of kosher products. Id.
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means "fit" or "proper" under Jewish dietary laws.21 These
dietary laws were derived from the Bible, have been followed by
Jewish people for thousands of years.22 Although members of
the Jewish faith generally agree as to what constitutes kosher
food and what proper kosher food preparation is, occasional
disputes arise as to whether particular foods are kosher, or have
been prepared according to specific required procedures. 23 Any
disagreements, however, have not troubled states in enacting
legislation defining "kosher" within their respective kosher fraud
laws.24 A consensus exists among consumers that "kosher"
refers to undisputed Orthodox Jewish standards. 25 Whether a
21 These Jewish dietary laws primarily dictate what animals, birds, and fish
may be eaten and the manner in which they must be prepared for consumption.
Further, the laws mandate that meat must not be consumed or cooked together with
milk or other dairy products. The word "kashrut" is the Hebrew word for kosher. 6
ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 26, 27 (1996).
22 See, e.g., Leviticus 11:44-45. Levitticus reads,
For I, the LORD, am your God; and you shall make and keep yourselves
holy, because I am holy. You shall not make yourselves unclean, then by
any swarming creature that crawls on the ground. Since I, the LORD,
brought you up from the land of Egypt that I might be your God, you shall
be holy, because I am holy.
Id.; see also Leviticus 7:26 ("And ye shall eat no manner of blood, whether it be fowl
or of beast, in any of your dwellings.").
23 For example, the modern view is that "only those birds for which there is a
tradition that they are 'clean' are permitted." 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 27
(citations omitted). "The Committee of Laws and Standards of the Rabbinical
Assembly of America (Conservative) has ruled that both strugeon and swordfish are
permitted, whereas in England the Ashkenazi authorities forbid sturgeon while the
Sephardi permit it." Id. (citations omitted).
24 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW I] § 14-901(f) (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. Ch. 94, § 156 (1996) (providing for compliance with "orthodox Jewish religious
standards"); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 9 645/1 (West 1993) (establishing that food
products are "kosher" as set forth in "the Code of Jewish Laws"); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 69.90.010 (West 1992) (providing for compliance with "traditional Jewish
dietary law"). "The statutory provisions at issue in this case have been interpreted
for decades as equating 'kosher' with 'prepared in accordance with orthodox Hebrew
religious requirements."' Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d
at 445. For similar interpretations of the word "kosher" by other courts, see, e.g.,
Erlich v. Mun. Court of the Beverly Hills Judicial Dist., 360 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1961);
People v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.S.2d 833 (2d Dep't 1940); People v. Atlas, 170 N.Y.S. 834
(1st Dep't 1918); State v. Glassman, 441 N.Y.S.2d 346 (County Ct. 1981); People v.
Johnson Kosher Meat Prods., Inc., 248 N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1964).
2 See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 445; see also
Amicus Curiae Brief of The National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Policy
at 8, Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir.
1995) (No. 94-1918) (stating that "even though some branches of Judaism sanction
the consumption of non-kosher food, all accept the same code of Jewish law as the
source of kosher dietary requirements...."); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Anti-
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particular individual actually understands or is even aware of
this consensus concerning what constitutes "kosher," she
nevertheless must trust the vendor's interpretation of the
dietary laws as if she possessed the knowledge herself.26
Consequently, with this general level of understanding in the
minds of both Jewish and non-Jewish consumers alike, it
becomes of utmost importance that the representations of
merchants be accurate regarding the product they are
"expos[ing] for sale,"27  so as to meet these consumers'
expectations in the marketplace.28
Judge Gershon held that New York State's kosher fraud
laws could not be enforced without violating the Establishment
Clause 29 of the United States Constitution. 30 She began her
discussion by quickly rejecting defendant's contention that
"kosher laws are essentially registration statutes,"31 which
"merely require vendors to conform their products to general
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith at 8, Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608
A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992) (No. 32-525) (stating that there are certain standard
violations that are recognized by all who follow the Jewish dietary laws, such as a
kosher restaurant serving pork or where the same plates are used for both meat and
dairy products); Joseph P. Fried, Court Ruling Highlights Divergences On "Kosher",
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2000, at B3. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Barghout,
noted that "[tihe mere fact that various sects may have different interpretations
does not create an intra-faith dispute as to the basic meaning of what is and is not
kosher." Barghout, 66 F.3d at 1341 n.9. The Barghout Court concluded that the
"record [was] totally inadequate to determine whether there [was] a meaningful
intra-faith dispute over the meaning of kosher." Id.
26 See Sheila Himmel & Cecilia Kang, Chef Suspended as D.A Investigates, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 23, 2000 (pointing out that even Jewish people who do
not strictly adhere to the Jewish dietary laws would agree that pork is not kosher).
27 N.Y. AGRIC. & MK'rS. § 201-a (McKinney 2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1451
(2000) (declaring that it is essential for consumers to have access to accurate
information).
28 See Karen Ruth Lavy Lindsay, Comment, Can Kosher Fraud Statutes Pass
the Lemon Test?: The Constitutionality of Current and Proposed Statutes, 23
DAYTON L. REV. 337, 338 (1998) ("[Cjonsumers typically rely upon representations
that particular foods are kosher, the goal of kosher food laws has been to prevent
consumer fraud."). Nelson Pugh, director of marketing in Florida's State
Department of Agriculture commented, "[C]onsumers have an expectation of what is
kosher" and added that "[olur obligation is to assist them." Id.; see also Shirish
Date, Florida's Kosher Food Campaign Questioned; Backers: State Program Doesn't
Push Religion, PALM BEACH POST, June 10, 1999, at 1A.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also supra note 9.
30 See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 455 ("Even
where the ... laws describe some specific procedures.., the procedures refer back
to orthodox Hebrew religious requirements ...
31 Id. at 451.
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consumer expectations."32 Judge Gershon's narrow analysis of
the kosher fraud laws focused entirely on the Establishment
Clause, while finding it unnecessary to give any significant
weight to the defendant's constitutional and legitimate end-to
preserve the integrity of the market and protect consumers from
being cheated. 33
Judge Gershon applied the three-pronged Lemon test
formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman34 in order to determine
whether or not the statutory provisions violated the
Establishment Clause.35 Under the Lemon test, the statute first
must have a secular purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;36
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion.37 Judge Gershon preliminarily concluded that
New York State's kosher fraud laws "were enacted at least in
part to protect consumers of kosher products from fraud," thus
satisfying the first prong of the test.38 Judge Gershon, however,
found problems under the second and third prongs of the Lemon
test, stating that the laws "foster excessive entanglement and
advance religion because they require the State to affirmatively
assume ongoing obligations of enforcement of purely religious
laws, inevitably requiring the State to rely on religious authority
and interpretation to properly enforce them."39 Judge Gershon
32 Id. at 455.
33 See id.
34 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35 See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 452.
3G Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (holding that a statute
allowing public schools to lend books to private sectarian schools had a secular
purpose).
37 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
38 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 452-53 ("The
purpose of the statute, manifestly, is to prevent and punish fraud....") (quoting
People v. Atlas, 170 N.Y.S. 834, 835-36 (1st Dep't 1918)).
39 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 456. Judge
Gershon heavily relied on the prohibitions put forth in Lemon, "sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity," in
reaching its decision. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). But cf. Jones v. Butz, 374 F.Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(stating that the challenged laws do not create excessive entanglement simply
because they use a word of religious significance). The Supreme Court has indicated
that "some limited and incidental entanglement between church and state authority
is inevitable in a complex modern society...." Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats,
Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116,
123 (1982)).
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ultimately concluded that New York State's kosher fraud laws
were unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.40 In
response to the Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc.
decision, New York State Governor George Pataki commented
that the purpose of "[t]hese laws [was to] protect New Yorkers
from consumer fraud," and directed the state's Department of
Agriculture and Markets to appeal the decision.41
It is submitted that Judge Gershon was incorrect in holding
New York State's kosher fraud laws unconstitutional.
Furthermore, Judge Gershon erred in dismissing defendant's
consumer protection argument, affording it inadequate
consideration in light of the potential ramifications of her
decision. A correct analysis would have focused on the right of
all consumers, irrespective of their individual religion, to be
protected from fraud and misrepresentation when purchasing
food from merchants in the marketplace.
This Comment asserts that the right to be protected from
fraud and misrepresentation extends to all individuals. The
State has an interest and obligation to protect its citizens from
being deceived as to what food products they are purchasing
from merchants, including those products that are represented
as kosher. Governmental regulation of kosher food is necessary
to protect the general public from consumer fraud. This
Comment will first explain what prompted New York State to
enact the statutory provisions in question, and then explain why
it is necessary in today's marketplace to maintain them. This
Comment will then analyze the kosher fraud laws under each
prong of the Lemon test. Finally, it will conclude that given the
constitutionality of the kosher fraud laws and the necessity to
protect American citizens from being deceived, it is within the
government's constitutional power and responsibility to enforce
these laws.
I. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN PREVENTING CONSUMER FRAUD
The Kosher food industry in the United States is a fifty
billion-dollar industry.42 In 1979, only 1,000 products were
40 See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
41 Fried, supra note 25, at B3.
42 See Date, supra note 28, at 1A (reporting on the substantial annual growth of
kosher food in the United States); see also Suein L. Hwang, Kosher-Food Firms Dive
Into Mainstream, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1993, at B1 (reporting the 1992 U.S. sales of
[Vol.75:485
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marked with a kosher seal of approval.4 3 In 1989, the number of
products bearing a kosher seal of approval soared to 17,500.44
Compared to growth in overall food sales, kosher food growth
numbers are significantly higher: ten percent versus one percent
or two percent.45  "A certificate guaranteeing rabbinical
supervision, can now be found on thousands of mass-produced
foods, especially in Israel and the United States .... Airlines,
hotels, restaurants, and catering firms throughout the world
supply [kosher] food on a regular basis."46 Basic business
motivation is the primary reason for the increased number of
kosher certified products and food processors seeking kosher
certification. 47
The fact that selling kosher products can amount to a
significant financial benefit, along with the fact that it is
"'extremely difficult, if not impossible, for even an expert to tell'
when kosher laws have not been followed simply by looking at
all products that have been given the seal of kosher certification). Reported sales to
consumers who specifically sought out the kosher seal of approval were $35 billion.
Id. The kosher seal of approval is a symbol that a food processor places on the label
of the product to inform the retailer and ultimate consumer that the product has
been inspected by a supervising rabbi. See Caroline E. Mayer, Who's Keeping Kosher
Now? Manufacturers Value Rabbi's Seal of Approval, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1989, at
El. There are in total about fifty different symbols representing the designation of
kosher food. Id. at E2.
43 See Mayer, supra note 43, at El.
44 See id.; see also Lindsay, supra note 28, at 343 (noting the large increase in
the sale of kosher food between 1989 and 1993); Hwang, supra note 42, at B1
(noting that the number of kosher certified products rose from 18,000 in 1989 to
23,600 in 1993).
45 See Date, supra note 28, at 1A. Other figures estimate that the kosher food
market has grown about twelve to fifteen percent annually. See Ellen Simon, Kosher
Foods Grow More Popular, Profitable; Muslims, Vegetarians Put Food in
Mainstream, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 12, 2000, at B4.
46 Lindsay, supra note 28, at 342.
47 See Mayer, supra note 42, at E2 (noting that many food processors typically
seek kosher certification for business purposes). One rabbi notes, "It's a marketing
system, a profit-making endeavor." Id. Many food processors attempt to distinguish
themselves from the rest of the kosher food market by attaching their own kosher
seal of approval. For example, Rabbi Menachem Genack's seal of approval, a circle
with a U inside, is the best known and most widely used kosher food symbol. Id.; see
also Hwang, supra note 42, at B1 (pointing to a study done by Dannon Yogurt
Company, that expected an annual sale of $2 million, due to the Circle U placed on
some of its products and noting that Empire Kosher Poultry Inc.'s sales jumped
fourteen percent to $7 million by entering their frozen pizzas and prepackaged
luncheon meats into the kosher food market). "With companies very aggressive in
terms of trying to gain market share, even the smallest edge.., is significant."
Mayer, supra note 42, at E2.
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the finished product on a grocery store shelf is a perfect recipe
for fraudulent mislabeling by vendors."48 Consequently, it is
tremendously profitable for a vendor to represent her food as
kosher. This financial impetus compounded by the fact that
most consumers are unable to verify that a product is in fact
kosher, provides vendors with an incentive to misrepresent
products as "kosher."49
A. Who is the kosher food consumer?
It has been estimated that approximately 6 million
Americans consciously seek kosher food in the supermarket.50
Yet only 1.5 million of them are of the Jewish faith.51 To
illustrate the vast number of kosher food consumers, it may be
beneficial to begin by providing examples of some other
moderately sized classes of consumers who follow certain aspects
of the Jewish dietary laws, such as Muslims, Seventh Day
Adventists, and Rastafarians. 52 While many Jewish kosher food
consumers regularly purchase food to comply with religious
dietary requirements, the great majority of kosher food
consumers make their decision based on criteria other than their
religion.53  In fact, the majority of kosher food consumers
48 Stephen F. Rosenthal, Note, Food For Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 954 (1997)
(citations omitted); see also Catherine Beth Sullivan, Comment, Are Kosher Food
Laws Constitutionally Kosher?, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 201, 208 (1993). ("In
the late nineteenth century, many profiteers and charlatans were passing off non-
kosher food as kosher. Since most Jewish immigrants were completely unfamiliar
with their local surroundings, these 'kosher crooks' were able to successfully deceive
their customers."); see generally HAROLD P. GASTWIRT, FRAUD, CORRUPTION, AND
HOLINESS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE SUPERVISION OF JEWISH DIETARY
PRACTICE IN NEW YORK CITY 1881-1940 (1974) (James P. Shenton ed. 1974).
49 See Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1356 (N.J. 1992)
("Because of those higher prices, and because most consumers cannot determine
whether foods labeled as 'kosher' were prepared under 'kosher standards,'
unscrupulous vendors can reap substantial profits by misleading consumers into
believing their products are kosher.") (citations omitted).
50 Mayer, supra note 42, at E2.
51 See id; see also Hwang, supra note 42, at BI (reporting that only forty
percent of Hebrew National's frankfurter consumers are Jewish).
52 Mayer, supra note 42, at E2. It is a common practice among many religions
to refrain from eating pork. See id.; Mark A. Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and
the Establishment Clause: Are They Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 11
(1992) (noting that "adherents of religions with dietary restrictions similar to
Judaism's" are also kosher food consumers). But see Date, supra note 28, at 1A ("A
full fifty percent buy kosher for no religious reason at all. . .
53 See Berman, supra note 52, at 11.
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purchase kosher food because they believe it to be of a greater
quality than non-kosher food.5 4 Perhaps those who hold this
view do so because of their belief that kosher products are
awarded a heightened degree of attention in the preparation
process.55 Many individuals purchase kosher food for dietary
reasons, relying on certain representations made in order to
avoid serious health injury, such as those who are lactose-
intolerant or allergic to certain types of seafood.5 6 For example,
an allergist noted that a person with an allergic condition "could
have itching all over their body, hives, collapse, [or] lose blood
pressure" from consuming shellfish.57  Other kosher food
consumers seek out kosher food for health and sanitary
purposes.5 8  Such dietary purposes further illustrate that
consumers of kosher food are not necessarily Jewish, and are not
selecting kosher food for any particular religious purpose. 59
54 See Mayer, supra note 42, at El ("A growing number of non-Jews have been
buying kosher because of the perception that it is better quality and healthier ....
It's like a Good Housekeeping seal of approval."). Id. According to Menachem
Lubinsky, president of Integrated Marketing Communications, a New York kosher-
food marketing company, many consumers purchase kosher food, "because they
perceive it to be cleaner or purer or healthier." Date, supra note 28, at 1A.
55 See Lindsay, supra note 28, at 344 (citing Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 2d
859, 862 (N.D. Ga. 1993)); see also Mayer, supra note 43, at El ("I'm not Jewish and
neither is my wife. But I do know that if I'm out and see 'kosher' on a product,... I
will pick up that product because I know someone is watching.").
56 See Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 579 A.2d 316, 324 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990), rev'd, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992) (noting that many people who
are allergic to certain foods such as shellfish, rely on kosher food representations to
avoid eating these foods); see also Mayer, supra note 42, at E2 ("Fish is fit to eat as
long as it has fins and scales. That rules out shrimp, crab, lobsters, and other
shellfish."); Bill Kent, You Don't Have To Be Jewish, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1999, (N.J.
Wkly.), at 4NJ (commenting on the increased demand for kosher food and the
reasons for which it is being purchased). One who is lactose-intolerant is able to eat
kosher pizza and other foods that are tofu-based rather than made with dairy
products. See Amy Westfeldt, Kosher Means Trendy, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 24,
1998, at 10.
57 HIMMEL & KANG, supra note 26, at (quoting allergist Steve Astor of
Mountain View, and further noting some of the dangers inherent in misrepresenting
certain foods such as pork).
58 See People v. Atlas, 170 N.Y.S. 834, 836 (1st Dep't 1918) (noting that certain
people in the general public may purchase kosher food because they believe that
"greater care and cleanliness" went into the kosher food preparation process than
may be expected otherwise); see also Mayer, supra note 43, at E2 (indicating that
health-conscious individuals may seek out kosher food labeled parve because it
contains no animal fat).
59 See People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663 (N.Y. Spec. 1916) (noting that the
New York kosher fraud statute could at any time affect any inhabitant of the state).
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To assist consumers of kosher food in their selections,
numerous supervisory agencies headed by rabbis certify food
that is kosher with a particular symbol, for instance the letter
"K" and the letter 'TU."60 For Jewish consumers of kosher food,
many Orthodox communities take an active role in policing the
food of their localities, including notifying the consumers when
the food has been fraudulently misrepresented as kosher.61 For
example, many kosher food consumers in Orthodox Jewish
communities only consume food products that possess certifying
marks approved by their individual rabbi.62 This practice of self-
regulation serves as a form of protection from kosher food fraud
for a limited number of kosher food consumers, a practice that
obviously does not help individuals outside an Orthodox
community. Consequently, it appears that the largest group of
kosher food consumers-the health-conscious, allergy sufferers,
Muslims, Seventh Day Adventists, or those seeking out what
they consider to be higher quality food-will be forced to rely on
representations made by vendors that products are in fact
kosher as advertised. In consideration of the foregoing
discussion, it becomes evident that the consumers who are most
likely to be affected by kosher fraud, the non-Jewish kosher food
consumers, are least likely to be able to protect themselves from
it.
B. Necessity of Government Regulation
At both the federal63 and state level, tremendous steps
60 According to Rabbi Yosef Wikler, publisher of Kashrus magazine, which lists
all kosher certifying agencies, there are 202 kosher endorsers, eighty percent of
which are controlled by what he terms "the big four": the Orthodox Union, which
endorses approximately seventy-five percent of the food products; the KOF-K
Kosher Supervision; Organized Kashruth Laboratories; and Star K Kosher
Certification. See Carole Paquette, Challenge to Kosher Laws Raises Some Deeper
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, (Long Island Wkly.) at 16; see also Lindsay, supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
61 See generally GASTWIRT, supra note 48 (explaining the difficulties in
ensuring kosher food quality on a large scale).
62 See Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 579 A.2d 316, 324 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990), rev'd, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992) (stating that there exists large
certifying organizations that inspect kosher food "in addition to the particular
supervising rabbi").
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 55 (2000) (prohibiting "false advertis[ing,"); 21 U.S.C. § 607
(providing that "labeling receptacles or coverings of meat or meat food products
inspected and passed; supervision by inspectors"). Congress's objective was clear
when it stated in its congressional declaration of policy:
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towards preventing consumer fraud have been taken.64 The
purpose behind consumer protection law is to protect the general
public from purchasing deceptively represented products. 65 In
the eyes of many consumers, most of whom are unable to verify
the quality of the products they are purchasing, "perception is
reality."66 The New York State kosher fraud laws 67 serve as a
safeguard for the unknowing consumer,68 imposing penalties on
those who do not abide by the consumer protection laws.69 On
the federal level, Congress created the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) in 1914 in an effort to ensure fair competition
in the marketplace. 70 In 1938, Congress expanded the role of the
Informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a
free market economy. Packages and labels should enable consumers to
obtain accurate information.., and should facilitate value comparisons.
Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to assist
consumers and manufacturers in reaching these goals in the marketing of
consumer goods.
15 U.S.C.S. § 1451.
64 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 349(a) (Consol. 2001) (declaring that "deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the
furnishing of any service in this state are hereby declared unlawful"); N.Y. GEN.
BUS. § 350(a) (Consol. 2000) (providing in pertinent part that "'Talse advertising'
means advertising, including labeling, of a commodity... if such advertising is
misleading in a material respect"). General Business Law sections 349 and 350 were
modeled upon the Federal Trade Commission's deceptive practice act. See Karlin v.
IVF Am., Inc., 712 N.E.2d 662 (N.Y. 1999).
65 See generally Charles of The Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 143
F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944) ("That law was not 'made for the protection of experts
but for the public .... .") (citations omitted). For an early example of judicial
construction of New York State's kosher fraud laws pre-dating General Business
Law sections 349 and 350, see People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663, 666 (N.Y. Spec.
Sess. 1916) ("Such protection [from fraud] is the evident aim of the statute .... ).
66 Stefanie L. Pearson, Keeping Kosher; Special Foods Gain in Popularity, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Sept. 8, 1999, at FD1.
67 N.Y. AGRIC. & MIES. §§ 201-a to -h (McKinney 2000).
68 See People v. Johnson Kosher Meat Prods., Inc., 248 N.Y.S.2d 429, 430 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1964) (stating that "the purpose of this section [N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. §
201(c)] is to give assurance to the consumer that he can rely on the labels-that for
once appearance and reality coincide"). New York was the first state to exhibit
concern about this problem, and as a result enacted the first kosher fraud statute in
1915, which subsequently has been used as a model by a number of other states. See
supra note 4; see also supra note 24 (providing a list of states that have adopted
very similar language to that used in the New York statute).
69 See N.Y. AGRIC. & MuTs. § 201(a) (stating that one who violates the kosher
fraud laws may be charged with either a class A misdemeanor or a class E felony,
depending on the retail value of the product).
70 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
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FTC to include ensuring "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce."' This was, "a significant amendment showing
Congress's concern for consumers as well as for competitors."
72
New York State enacted its own laws to protect consumers from
fraud in 1970, modeled on the federal example, which included
the power of the Attorney General to enforce the laws.
73
Subsequently, an amendment was added creating a private
cause of action for consumers. 74 It is evident that the law
respects promises made to buyers and that the aim of these
statutes, both on the federal and state level, is to protect
promises made to buyers and to prevent dishonesty in the
marketplace.7 5 It is essential to the efficiency of the marketplace
that consumers in fact receive what they have chosen to
purchase. 76 "Consumers have the right to an honest market
place [sic] where trust prevails between buyer and seller."77
Consumers of kosher food are equally vulnerable to deceptive
consumer practices and are no less entitled to protection from
fraud than are consumers of any other product being sold on the
market. 78
71 See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384 (1965).
72 Id. ("When the Commission was created by Congress in 1914, it was directed
by 5 [of the Federal Trade Commission Act] to prevent 'unfair methods of
competition in commerce.' ").
73 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 349(a) (Consol. 1970); N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 350 (Consol.
1970); see also supra note 62.
74 The Statute was amended in 1980 to provide a private cause of action. 1980
N.Y. Laws 346.
75 See Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 647
N.E.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. 1995) (holding New York consumer protection statute [GEN.
Bus. § 349,1 applicable where "consumer-oriented" conduct is within the purview of
the statute).
76 See Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 386-87 n.16 ("[A] buyers real concern
is with the truth of the substantive claims or promises made to him,.....); see also
HIMMEL & KANG, supra note 26 ("[Elveryone expects to be served exactly what a
menu claims.").
77 Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund, 647 N.E.2d at 744 (quoting
Governor's Memorandum, reprinted in 1970 N.Y. Legis. Ann., at 174).
78 See Defendant-Intervenors' Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants-
Intervenors' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 16, Commack Self-Service
Kosher Meats, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Agric. and lvkts., 106 F. Supp. 2d 445
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that "kosher food consumers are not excluded from the
protection of the consumer fraud laws simply because they depend on a religiously
defined term and "are entitled to rely on the representations of vendors about their
products"). In the kosher food context, a label signifying rabbinical supervision and
proper preparation is essential. "It is generally accepted that it is a deceptive
practice to state falsely that a product has received a testimonial from a respected
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The injury suffered by deceived consumers of kosher food is
no different from that suffered by any victim of deceptive
advertising.7 9  At a minimum, all deceived consumers get
defrauded out of the additional money they were willing to spend
to receive what they considered to be a product of greater
value.80 Whatever reasons a consumer may have for purchasing
particular products, be it kosher food or nutritional supplements,
the state has an interest in protecting its residents from
unscrupulous vendors who, without government intervention,
will surely take advantage of the unknowing consumer.81
Therefore, there are important policy reasons behind the state
regulating the sale of kosher food, and furthermore, the state has
the authority to offer such protection.8 2 Courts have consistently
recognized the importance of the protection the kosher fraud
source." Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 389 (citing as an example Niresk Indus.,
Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960)); see also Frank Bruni,
Constitutionality of State's Kosher Laws is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at
B1 (noting the position of proponents of the state's role in kosher inspections: "[T]he
government needs to protect the buyers of products labeled kosher just as it protects
the buyers of products labeled low-salt and low-fat"). One kosher food consumer,
who is Presbyterian, comments that "[tihe question I should not have to ask is, am I
getting what rm paying for. If rm not, then the person who is selling this product to
me is committing fraud." Bill Kent, You Don't Have To Be Jewish, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
4, 1999, § 14NJ (N.J. Wkly.), at 4.
79 See Rosenthal, supra note 48, at 960 (discussing the dual purpose that
kosher fraud laws serve-both to protect Jewish consumers from spiritual harm as
well as to protect all kosher food consumers from economic harm). The potential
harm may be much more severe in certain cases. See, e.g., Richard A. Merrill,
Reducing Diet-Induced Cancer Through Federal Regulation: Opportunities and
Obstacles, 38 VAND. L. REV. 513 (1985) (noting the federal government's initiative
in creating regulatory agencies is to monitor human exposure to possible
carcinogenic substances); see generally Stephen H. McNamara, So You Want To
Market a Food and To Make Health-Related Claims-How Far Can You Go? What
Rules of Law Will Govern the Claims You Want To Make?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
421, 422 (1998) (discussing the federal regulatory rules that authorize what health-
related claims may be placed on labels by companies in advertising foods, "including
not only conventional food products but also medical foods, dietary supplements,
'functional foods,' 'nutraceuticals,' and other [food] products .... ); see also supra
note 52.
80 See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 106 F. Supp. 2d 445,
459 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing kosher food consumers position that they "have a
'pocketbook interest' to the extent that they are willing to continue paying higher
prices provided the products they are purchasing are indeed kosher").
81 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also People v. Atlas, 170 N.Y.S.
834 (1st Dep't 1918) (stating that "[uit needs no argument to show that it is
competent for the Legislature within its general police power to enact legislation to
prevent and punish fraud and imposition") (citations omitted).
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laws provide consumers, and have consistently upheld these
laws against challenges until recent years.8 3 Judge Gershon's
decision is inconsistent with both the majority of courts'
interpretation of kosher fraud statutes, as well as with the
general purpose behind deception laws.
II. NEW YORK STATE'S KOSHER FRAUD LAWS Do NOT VIOLATE
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
New York State's Kosher Fraud Statute defines "kosher" as
"prepared in accordance with orthodox Hebrew religious
requirements."8 4  In Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc.,
Judge Gershon correctly began her analysis of the kosher fraud
laws by applying the Lemon test, which is the hurdle over which
the laws must climb if they are to survive the constitutional
challenge of the Establishment Clause.85  Judge Gershon
concluded that the statute on its face did not satisfy the second
and third prongs of the Lemon test, and therefore violated the
Establishment Clause.8 6 In fact, Judge Gershon misapplied the
Lemon test because the statutory provisions governing kosher
food in New York satisfy all three prongs of the test, and further
the statutes do not violate the principles of the Establishment
Clause; therefore they are constitutional on their face.
A. The Establishment Clause
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting the
83 See Barghout v. Bureau of Kosher Meat and Food Control, 66 F.3d 1337,
1342 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding Baltimore's kosher food consumer protection ordinance
violated the Establishment Clause); Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 579
A.2d 316, 324 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (striking down for the first time a
kosher fraud statute), rev'd, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J. 1992). For a list of cases upholding
kosher fraud statutes, see, for example, Hygrade v. Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266
U.S. 497 (1925); Erlich v. Mun. Court of the Beverly Hills Judicial Dist., 360 P.2d
334 (Cal. 1961); Sossin Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972); People v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.S.2d 833 (2d Dep't 1940); People v. Atlas,
170 N.Y.S. 834 (1st Dep't 1918); People v. Johnson Kosher Meat Prods., Inc., 248
N.Y.S.2d 429 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1964); People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663 (Sp. Sess.
1916).
84 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. § 201-a(9) (McKinney 2000).
85 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
86 See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 106 F. Supp. 2d 445,
459 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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establishment of religion...."-s In 1947, the Supreme Court
incorporated the Establishment Clause into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby extending the
Establishment Clause restrictions on the federal government to
the states.88 In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter,89 the Supreme Court asserted the meaning of the
Establishment Clause:
[I]t means that government may not promote or affiliate itself
with any religious doctrine or organization, may not
discriminate among persons on the basis of their religious
beliefs and practices, may not delegate a governmental power
to a religious institution, and may not involve itself too deeply
in such an institution's affairs.90
To begin with, one must keep in mind when analyzing the
government's role in enforcing laws that may have a beneficial
effect on a particular religion, that there is a difference between
governmental actions which establish religion and those which
accommodate persons who are practicing their religion.91 "The
Constitution does not 'require complete separation of church and
state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility towards any.' "92
The Supreme Court affirmed this concept in Jones v. Butz.93 In
Jones, the Court upheld an exception for kosher slaughtering
from the general requirements of the Humane Slaughter Act.
94
The Court found that, "defining humaneness... with the
method of Jewish ritual slaughter" was not an attempt by the
government to establish religion.95 Similarly, the kosher fraud
laws merely define a means of enforcement in relation to the
Jewish religion. Thus, the kosher fraud laws serve as consumer
protection statutes, and do not disserve the purpose the framers
had in mind when contemplating the Establishment Clause.
87 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
88 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (citation omitted).
89 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
9D Id. at 590-91 (citation omitted). For a summation of the facts in this case, see
infra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
91 See Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc., v. State, 579 A.2d 316, 326 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990), rev'd, 608 A.2d 1353 (1992).
92 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 608 A.2d at 1370 (Stein, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984)).
93 374 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 419 U.S. 806 (1974).
94 The Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1988).
95 See Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
B. The Lemon Test
The benchmark used to determine whether a statute is
constitutional under the Establishment Clause is the three-
prong test created in Lemon v. Kurtzman.96 For a statute to pass
constitutional muster under Lemon: (1) it must have a secular
purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must not foster
an excessive entanglement with religion. 97 To satisfy the first
prong of the Lemon test, the statute must have a "secular
legislative purpose."98 The Supreme Court of the United States
has noted that for a statute to fail the first prong, there must be
"no question that the statute.. . was motivated wholly by
religious considerations... [even if] the benefits to religion [are]
substantial.. .. "99 Consequently, it is not a violation of the
Establishment Clause for a statute to be "motivated in part by a
religious purpose."100 The legislative motivation behind New
York State's kosher fraud laws was to protect consumers from
false representations in the marketplace, and hence, was not
"motivated wholly by religious concerns." 10 The Committee was
cognizant of the fact that many merchants were attempting to
pass off their non-kosher food products as kosher, as well as
attempting to hide this fact from the kosher inspectors, and
therefore the Committee created a presumption of intent to
defraud within the statute when non-kosher meat was found in a
kosher establishment.102  This eye towards the efficient
enforcement of the consumer protection laws is evidenced by the
Committee's attempt through the laws to "eliminate a vice that
96 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
97 See id. (citations omitted).
98 Id. at 612.
99 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
100 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (invalidating a state statute under
the "secular purpose" prong because the legislative history reflected that the
statute's sole purpose was to return prayer to the classroom); see also Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (stating that it is not a requirement that the law be "unrelated
to religion"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (1984) (upholding a city's right to include a
creche in its annual Christmas display, because, viewing the display as a whole, the
Court found a legitimate secular purpose, i.e., celebrating a traditional holiday).
101 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
102 See GovERNoR's BILL JACKET, 1945, Ch. 844, p.5 . 'The presumption created
by the statute would facilitate conviction of violators and tend to effectuate
enforcement of the so-called 'kosher' law." Id.
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has been growing in recent years--the state's difficulty in
policing the kosher food industry.0 3Merely referring to the
religious term "kosher" to serve a legitimate secular purpose is
not inconsistent with the "purpose" prong. As Judge Gershon
conceded, "[the Challenged Laws were enacted at least in part
to protect consumers of kosher products from fraud."'10 4 Thus,
the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test is satisfied. 0 5
The "primary effects" prong of the Lemon test, the second
hurdle, has created a greater barrier to kosher fraud laws
seeking constitutional status. Under Lemon, the "principal or
primary effect [of the statute] must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion." 0 6 Judge Gershon held that the kosher
fraud laws violated the "primary effects" prong of Lemon,
reasoning that the procedures that must be followed in
adherence to kosher food preparation "refer back to orthodox
Hebrew religious requirements,"'07and therefore, "have the
unconstitutional effect of endorsing and advancing religion." 08
Though the statute requires one to "refer back to orthodox
Hebrew religious requirements," 10 9 it does not necessarily
endorse the Jewish religion.110 Reliance on Jewish dietary laws
does not make the primary effect of the statute to advance or
endorse Judaism."' Legislation may be based on religious
103 Id.
104 See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 106 F. Supp. 2d 445,
453 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats v. Rubin, 986 F.
Supp. 2d 153, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)).
105 See id. But see Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353 (N.J.
1992). The Court in Ran-Day's held the first prong to be violated, reasoning that,
"the truths being marketed are... religious truths." Id. at 1366. The Court was
incorrect to analyze whether the truths being marketed were religious truths, under
the "purpose" prong because the "purpose" prong considers legislative motivation
behind the statute. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
106 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968)).
107 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
108 Id. at 459. Before concluding whether or not the statute has an
impermissible effect of advancing or endorsing religion, Establishment Clause
jurisprudence requires a determination of whether "the challenged governmental
action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents as a disapproval of their
individual religious choices." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (quoting Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390
(1985)).
109 Id. at 455.
110 See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
111 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 682 (1984) (noting that the
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principles, and still be secular in nature thus satisfying the
purpose of the Lemon test. This principle was illustrated in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.112 In
that case, the Court allowed a Jewish menorah to be placed in a
holiday display, and explained that even an explicitly religious
reference may be allowed if it conveys a secular message and
does not endorse any particular religion.113 Similarly, the kosher
fraud statute's primary effect is secular in nature in that it is
designed to prevent deceptive behavior and in so doing, protect
the general public. 114
Judge Gershon relied on Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v. Grumet,"15 reasoning that the kosher
fraud laws created an "impermissible advancement of [a]
religious belief."116 In Grumet, the Court struck down a New
York statute that had created an independent school district,
populated entirely by members of the Satmir Hasidic sect of
Judaism.117 The Court found that "while the statute did not
expressly delegate governmental authority based on religious
criteria, it effectively did so, and thus was unconstitutional."118
The effect of the New York statute in Grumet, which was
directed at one individual religious group, is unlike those of the
impermissible effect of the statute is lacking if the "reason or effect merely happens
to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some... religion"); see also Sossin Sys.,
Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 So. 2d 28, 29-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(upholding a challenge to a Florida ordinance that regulated kosher food fraud,
reasoning that the ordinance's effect was merely to "serve to safeguard the
observance of its tenets," and not to establish a religion). In Sossin, the Court
reasoned that the legislative motivation behind the enactment of the consumer
protection laws was not to establish a religion, but to protect kosher food consumers
from being deceived. Id. at 29.
112 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989).
1113 See id. at 617-20. In this case, the Court found that a menorah exhibited in
a Hanukah display was not a violation of the Establishment Clause because the
menora's message was not exclusively religious. Id. at 613; see also Lynch, 465
U.S. at 671 (holding that a creche containing both secular and religious
representations had no impermissible effect).
114 See Mathis Chazanov, Keeping Kosher Rules Tougher After Major Store
Loses Its Certificate, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at B1 (providing an illustration of
how the closing down of the biggest kosher retailer in Los Angeles can affect the
community's awareness of violators of the kosher fraud laws).
115 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
116 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Rubin, 106 F. Supp. 2d 445,
457-58 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
117 Id.
11s Id. (citing Grumet, 512 U.S. at 698-99).
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kosher fraud laws, which confer an important benefit on the
general public as a whole. Considering Jewish people nationally
consume less than thirty percent of kosher food, it is hardly
accurate to conclude that the primary effect of the kosher fraud
laws is to endorse the Jewish religion. Moreover, Orthodox
Jewish Communities receive only a minor benefit, if any, from
the kosher regulations." 9 When the incidental effects the kosher
fraud laws have on the Jewish religion are balanced against the
overall purpose and primary effect of the statutes, the consumer
protection laws outweigh any suggestion of an advancement of
religion. The primary effect of the kosher fraud laws is
consistent with the secular purpose the laws were enacted to
serve: to protect a large class of consumers from fraud, and not
just individuals associated with a particular religion.
The third and final prong that must be satisfied under
Lemon states that the "statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.!"120  Judge Gershon
held that an excessive government entanglement with the
Jewish religion existed, reasoning that "the laws of kashrut are
intrinsically religious" 121 and "the state itself takes on the
traditional religious supervisory role."122  It is well settled,
however, that "[slome limited and incidental entanglement
between church and state authority is inevitable in a complex
modern society.' 23  The entanglement that the kosher fraud
laws arguably foster is at most 'limited and incidental."124
To begin with, Judge Gershon mischaracterizes the state's
role in preventing kosher fraud when she explains that the state
"takes on the traditional religious supervisory role" in enforcing
119 See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
120 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n
of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
121 Commack Self-Service, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (quoting Ran-Day's County
Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1363 (N.J. 1992)).
122 Id. at 455 (quoting Ran-Day's County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1373); see also
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. § 26-a (McKinney 2001) (laying out the composite, function
and duties of the state created advisory board on kosher law enforcement).
123 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982) (striking down a
Massachusetts statute that allowed churches and schools to veto liquor licenses for
establishments located within five hundred feet of the church or school).
124 See Ran-Day's County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1373 (Stein, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that it is "excessive entanglement" which is proscribed) (quoting
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976)).
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the kosher fraud laws. 125 In the court's reasoning, it relied on
the rationale employed in Ran-Dav's County Kosher Inc. v. State
of New Jersey.126 In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
invalidated New Jersey's kosher fraud regulations, holding them
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. 127 The court
reasoned that because the statutes were based on religious
doctrine and required the state to enforce the laws, excessive
entanglement necessarily existed.128 This position is ill founded
because the statute does not require the state inspector to have
any particular religious knowledge in order to enforce the
laws.129 Moreover, because the standards to be applied are clear
on their face, the state need not subjectively impose its own
interpretation of what is "kosher."130 In Commack Self-Service
Kosher Meats, Inc.,131 the government official responsible for
enforcing the kosher fraud laws testified in his deposition to his
role in kosher law enforcement:
Q: What criteria do you as director establish for yourself and
those under your supervision within the kosher law
enforcement division for determining what is kosher and what
is not kosher?
A: What the marketplace considers and identifies as kosher is
most important. It is definitely not based on any studies of
religious matters. 132
Judge Gershon rejected defendant's argument that the laws
simply require vendors to conform their products to "general
125 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
126 Ran-Day's County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1373.
127 See id. at 1355 (stating that "[t]here are differences of opinion concerning
the application and 1356").
128 See id.
129 See Mathis Chazanov, Keeping Kosher; Rules Tougher After Major Store
Loses Its Certificate, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at B1. Chazanov writes,
"[G]overnment inspectors are not concerned with the rituals and ancient rabbinical
rulings that govern the preparation of kosher food. Instead, they check the records
that butchers keep to prove they bought their merchandise from kosher producers
or packing houses." Id.
130 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
131 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats v. Rubin, 986 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y.
1997).
132 See Defendant-Intervenors' Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants-
Intervenors' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 25, Commack Self-Service
Kosher Meats v. New York State Dep't of Agriculture and Markets, 106 F. Supp. 2d
445 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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consumer expectations,"13 3 and thus do not require religious
doctrine to be interpreted. The court reasoned that the
expectations to which the vendors must conform are
"interpretations of religious law,"134 and therefore create an
excessive entanglement in their enforcement. 135 This argument
is without merit. Kosher food regulations are simply concerned
with whether food products represented as kosher comply with
various identification requirements, such as labeling and
advertising. As long as the government inspector is not herself
interpreting religious doctrine, the government's limited role in
merely enforcing the interpretation, provided it is for a secular
purpose, is incidental to the religious aspect of the legislation,
and thus creates no excessive entanglement. 136 Therefore, to
avoid an excessive entanglement under Lemon, it is necessary
that the government inspector ensure the representations made
by merchants conform to consumers' expectations as to what
constitutes kosher, but go no further than to serve this
function. 137  If this role is performed correctly, excessive
entanglement will not result.
CONCLUSION
In holding that New York State's kosher fraud laws violated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, Judge
Gershon not only misapplied the Establishment Clause test, but
of greater concern, completely disregarded the policies that
underlie consumer protection law and the practical realities
which modern society must face. Kosher food consumers
constitute a broad and growing class of American citizens, the
great majority of whom it appears, do not identify their kosher
purchasing needs with any particular religion. The original
purpose and current rationale behind kosher fraud legislation is
to protect consumers from fraud. It is necessary and
constitutionally within the state's enforcement power to protect
133 Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
134 Id.
135 See id.
136 See Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1373 (N.J. 1992)
(Stein, J., dissenting) ("The inquiry is essentially the same as that conducted by an
inspector evaluating compliance with health and safety regulations.").
137 See id. (Stein, J., dissenting) (noting how the New Jersey kosher food
regulations appear to be a "relatively unintrusive form of monitoring... rather
than religious judgments").
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kosher food consumers from fraud, as it protects consumers of
other products being marketed. Consequently, without
government protection, a large class of people will inevitably fall
prey to the deceptive practices that will become widespread
throughout the kosher food industry.
